research proposal-sample-good

 research proposal-sample-good Essay

对外经济贸易大学

University of International Business and Economics

硕士论文开题报告

Business Compensation and Incentives:

Data from Mergers and Acquisitions in

China's Listed Businesses

(高管薪酬与激励: 来自中国上市公司并购

交易的经验证据)

one particular

Contents

1 . Introduction ……………………………………………………………………… 1 installment payments on your Literature Review …………………………………………………………………2 several. Methodology…………………………………………………………………… four 4. Expectations………………………………………………………………………8 References ………………………………………………………………………… 9

一、前言 ………………………………………………………………………… 1 二、文献回顾 ……………………………………………………………………2 三、研究内容与方法……………………………………………………………… 4 四、结言 ………………………………………………………………………8 参考文献 ……………………………………………………………………… 9

Exec Compensation and Incentives: Data from Mergers and Acquisitions in China's Listed Firms

(高管薪酬与激励: 来自中国上市公司并购交易的经验证据) 开题报告

1 . Introduction

The topic of executive payment has been a hot topic monetary studies. Jensen and Ruback (1983) explained that " examination of the expense and rewards to competitive management clubs of failure or success in the takeover market will certainly aid in learning the forces that determine when and for what reason takeovers happen to be initiated, and why goal managers oppose or agree to such proposals. ”

Prior studies have established conceivable links between executives' self-interest and M& A actions. Main driving factors of executives making mergers and acquisitions had been identified: hubris (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), diversification of personal risk (Morck et approach. 1990; Might, 1995), plus the additional settlement associated with size (Murphy, 1985). Specifically, applying Western data, prior research has provided empirical evidence around the relationship of executives' settlement and firms' M& A activities. For example , Grinstein and Hribar (2004) show that bidder Entrepreneurs receive higher bonus payment when M& A discounts are greater; their results suggest that managerial power takes on a significant function in deciding M& A bonuses. Hartzell et approach. (2004) file that target Entrepreneurs obtain elevating wealth by simply sacrificing to trade their organizations.

As for China's listed companies, the scientific evidence about whether correct mergers and acquisitions happened is added too China. There exists evidence that efficient organizations acquired or perhaps merged less efficient companies in China (Li ainsi que al. the year 2003; Zhang, 2003). Also, there is certainly evidence that in a long term perspective the mergers and acquisitions did not improve firms' performance (Feng and Wu, 2001).

1

This requires all of us to take a closer look at the imbalance between firms' performance after M& A deals and executive settlement. However , very little is known about the relationship of executives' personal benefits and M& A deals in China, especially compared to Anglo-Saxon economies. Few researchers, to my knowledge, have offered empirical data explaining the potential link. one particular Therefore , I actually try to bring about existing literature by studying the explanation that executives' settlement is linked to firms' M& A actions in China and try to present empirical proof in China's listed companies.

In this paper, I illustrate the exclusive benefits accessible to executives of bidding companies after mergers and acquisitions, and ask just how these exclusive benefits impact managerial decision to engage in M& A deals. The paper tries to provide perception to the romance between executives' personal benefits and M& A offers by dealing with the following concerns. Firstly, truly does executives' personal benefits impacts firms' bureaucratic decisions of producing mergers and acquisitions? Second of all, how does executives' personal benefits affect firms' mergers and acquisitions and also to what extent?

The rest of the paper will be structured as follows. Another section offers a literature assessment. Section several presents test selection and empirical strategy. Section four discusses the empirical result and the final section concludes.

2 . Materials Review

installment payments on your 1 Business Compensation and Incentives

Settlement decisions are usually made by a board of...

References: [1] Bliss, Richard T. and Rosen, Rich J., " CEO Settlement and Bank Mergers, ”

Journal of economic Economics 61, 2001, pp. 107–138.

[2] Chhaochharia, Vidhi and Grinstein, Yaniv, " CEO Payment and Panel Structure, ”

Journal of Finance 64, 2009, pp. 231–261.

[3] Fama, Eugene F. and Michael C. Jensen, " Separation of ownership and control, ” Journal

of Law and Economics twenty six, 1983, pp. 301–325.

[4] Grinstein, Yaniv and Hribar, Paul, " CEO payment and bonuses: Evidence by

M& A bonuses, ” Journal of economic Economics 73, 2004, pp. 119–143.

[5] Harford, Jarrad and Li, Kai, " Decoupling CEO Wealth and Firm Functionality: The Case

of Acquiring Entrepreneurs, ” Log of Fund 2, 3 years ago, pp. 917–949.

banking sector, ” Log of Financial Economics 39, 1995, pp. 105–130.

[7] Jensen, Michael C. and Ruback, Richard H., " The industry for Company Control: The

Scientific Proof, ” Log of Financial Economics 11, 1983, pp. 5–50.

[8] Lambert, Richard, Larcker, Davidand and Verrecchia, Robert, " Stock portfolio Considerations in

Valuing Exec Compensation, ” Journal of Accounting Analysis 29, 1991,

[9] Malmendiera, Ulrike and Tate, Geoffrey, " Who makes acquisitions? CEO

Overconfidence and the Industry 's Response, ” Log of Financial Economics 89, 08,

of Financial 50, 95, pp. 1291–1308.

[11] Mehran, H., " Executive Settlement Structure, Possession, and Organization Performance, ”

Journal of Financial Economics 37, 1995, pp. 163–184.

[12] Morck, 3rd there�s r., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W., " Do Managerial Goals Drive Awful

Acquisitions? ” Journal of Finance forty-five, 1990, pp. 31–49.

[13] Murphy, E., " Business performance and Managerial Remuneration, ” Diary of

Accounting and Economics 7, 1985, pp. 11–42.

[14] Ozkan, Neslihan, " CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: A great Empirical

Investigation of UK Panel Data, ” European Financial Administration 17, 2009,